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INTRODUCTION
Almost twenty-five years ago, Yale law students Lisa Daugaard and Michael
Barr knocked on a professor's door to discuss what might loosely be called an
extracurricular activity.' They wanted to file a lawsuit against the U.S. government.
They intended to do so without ever having spoken to their purported clients-
thousands of Haitian nationals held incommunicado by the American military on
the U.S. naval base at Guantinamo Bay. They did not understand a word of Haitian
Creole and knew little if anything about the claims they might bring on behalf of the
detainees. And their proposed suit would follow on the heels of a nearly identical
case, filed months earlier by seasoned immigration lawyers, that had just been
dismissed with prejudice.2
It is no exaggeration to say that Lisa and Michael's plan bordered on ridiculous-
and their law professor, Harold Koh, more or less thought as much. Yet only a few
weeks later, as part of a larger team of lawyers and students, they filed the case on
behalf of the Haitians in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. What followed over the next fifteen months makes for one of the more
remarkable human rights stories of recent decades-a David-and-Goliath battle in
which a band of human rights lawyers and law students challenged the Justice
Department, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House over a
massive overseas Coast Guard and military operation involving thousands of Haitian
nationals. The litigation, Haitian Centers Council (HCC) v. Sale, evolved into two
distinct cases' presenting complex issues of law and policy that remain as relevant
today as ever: the U.S. government's use of Guantinamo as an extralegal detention
camp and the morally untenable practice of directly returning refugees interdicted on
the high seas to a place where they fear persecution.
On October 16, 2015, the New York Law School Law Review sponsored a
symposium that brought together many of the key figures involved in the case, from
plaintiffs' lawyers and former law students to government attorneys to Haitian activists
and the clients themselves.' We were especially honored to welcome the federal judge
who presided over the trial in the Guantinamo branch of the litigation, Judge Sterling
Johnson, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, as well
1. See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF LAW STUDENTS FOUGHT THE
PRESIDENT-AND WON 32-34 (First Scribner trade paperback ed. 2006). Almost all the information
about the litigation described in this piece is taken from this book, the author's extensive interview
notes, and BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, RODGER CITRON & MOLLY BEUTz LAND, A DOCUMENTARY
COMPANION TO STORMING THE COURT (2009).
2. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir. 1991), reh' denied, 954 F.2d 731
(11th Cir. 1992).
3. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that the U.S. government violated no
federal or international law by the forcible return to Haiti of interdicted Haitian. nationals who were
given no opportunity to establish a credible fear of persecution in their homeland); Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (ordering release of Haitian nationals held at
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, on grounds that their continued detention violated due process). I refer to the
foregoing Supreme Court decision as the "direct return" case in the text.
4. For more information, see Storming the Court. 25 Years After H.C.C. v. Sale, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., http://
www.nylslawreview.com/stormingthecourt/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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as U.S. Senator Christopher Coons, (D-Del.), who worked on the case as a third-year
law student at Yale. The symposium was the largest gathering of "alumni" of this
litigation to date-an occasion not only for analysis and inquiry, but for recollection
and reflection, with old friends and colleagues reuniting to consider both the legal
and political impact of the case and the ways it had affected them personally.
This symposium issue features contributions from four individuals at the
symposium who were intimately involved with HCC v. Sale-Judge Johnson, Senator
Coons, Professor Ray Brescia, who, like Senator Coons, worked on the litigation as
a law student, and Professor Harold Koh, who argued the "direct return" case before
the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the plaintiffs.s Before offering a brief
introduction to their contributions and some reflections on the symposium and Sale,
I provide here a summary of the case as context for their work.6
1. THE "HAITI CASE"
The "Haiti case," as it is still referred to by the plaintiffs' litigation team, traces
its origins back to December 1990, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide became Haiti's first'
democratically elected president.' Aristide was the popular choice of Haiti's poor and'
dispossessed, but he was seen as a threat by the country's brutal military forces and
the boujwazi, the tiny class of elites in Haiti that controlled the vast majority of the
country's wealth.' Aristide was ultimately ousted in a military coup in September
1991, and he fled first to Venezuela and then to the United States.' In the wake of
his departure, Haitian soldiers and paramilitary forces persecuted pro-Aristide
activists, particularly in Aristide strongholds such as Cit6 Soleil, a sprawling slum in
the capital of Port-au-Prince.1 0 As a consequence, many Haitians began to flee the
5. See id. For a list of the symposium speakers and their backgrounds, see Storming the Court: 25 Years After
H.C.C. v. Sale: Speakers, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., http://www.nylslawreview.com/storming-the-court-speakers/
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Storming the Court Speakers]. For the symposium program and
links to videos of the event, see Storming the Court: 25 YearsAfter H.C.C. v. Sale: Program, N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV., http://www.nylslawreview.com/storming-the-court-program/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
6. For further background, see generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1; Harold Hongju Koh & Michael J.
Wishnie, The Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: Guantanamo and Refoulement, in HUMAN
RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 385-432 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009); and Victoria Clawson,
Elizabeth Detweiler & Laura Ho, Essay, Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers
Council, 103 YALE L.J. 2337 (1994).
7. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Id.
9. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 4. Aristide was reinstalled as president after American
forces invaded Haiti in 1994. His presidency did not fundamentally change the country and was
considered by many to be a great disappointment. Aristide fled the country again in 2004 but returned
in 2011. He still resides in Haiti today, and recently became active in the presidential campaign for his
Fanmi Lavalas party candidate. David McFadden, Former President Aristide Leaps from Behind Scenes in
Haiti, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27,2016, 12:17 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e07f34e8167b44818
bdfdl6ac5e92cl7/former-president-aristide-leaps-behind-scenes-haiti.
10. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 4.
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country by boat, seeking safe haven from the military regime." From late October
1991 through May 1992, about 35,000 Haitians fled, often in unseaworthy vessels,
and headed into the Windward Passage between Haiti and Cuba.12
Concerned that the Haitians intended to reach American shores, and unwilling
to accept them in large numbers, the George H.W. Bush administration ordered
Coast Guard cutters into international waters to intercept the Haitian boats-a
policy made possible because former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc"
Duvalier had signed a treaty with the Reagan administration authorizing the United
States to interdict Haitian vessels in international waters." Under President Bush's
orders, Coast Guard cutters stopped every Haitian vessel they located, brought
everyone aboard, and blew up the Haitian boats as "hazards to navigation."14
In the first few weeks after the coup, with perhaps only a thousand Haitians
having fled, the Coast Guard kept them on the decks of its cutters and awaited
further instruction from Washington." But as more people began to flee Haiti, the
Bush administration opted to forcibly return everyone who did not potentially qualify
for refugee status.'6 Assisted by Creole interpreters, officials from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS)" on board the cutters conducted screening
interviews of the Haitians and split them into two groups: (1) those who had
demonstrated a "credible fear" of persecution if returned to Haiti, and (2) those who
were supposedly trying to reach the United States solely in search of greater economic
opportunity.'" Individuals who fell in the latter category were transported by Coast
Guard cutter to the docks of Port-au-Prince and handed over to the Haitian
military. 9 Those who had demonstrated a "credible fear" of persecution were flown
to the United States to file a formal application for asylum-a process that includes
the right to an attorney.20
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Agreement on Migrants-Interdiction, Haiti-U.S., Sept. 23, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 3559; GOLDSTEIN,
CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
14. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003, and most of its functions were assumed by various
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, including U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S.
Federal Agencies and Aliens, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/u-s-federal-
agencies-and-aliens (last updated Aug. 23, 2016).
18. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id. The more rigorous standard in an asylum proceeding requires that the applicant demonstrate a
"well-founded fear of persecution" based on the grounds of "race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (defining "refugee"); id.
§ 1158(b) (providing that asylum may be granted to a "refugee" and prescribing the burden of proof).
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Immigration attorneys and Haitian refugee advocates in Miami believed that the
INS interviews were too cursory and could potentially lead to the return of bona fide
refugees to Haiti. 21 Seeking reform of the procedures to identify those who might
qualify for asylum, Ira Kurzban and other lawyers filed the first case for the Haitians,
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in November 1991.22 Meanwhile, as more Haitians continued to
flee, the Coast Guard began transporting them to the American naval base at
Guantinamo Bay.23 The Haitians were housed in military tents on the tarmac of an
unused airfield and from that point forward, the screening interviews took place on
Guantinamo. 24
The Baker case played out at a lightning pace, driven by a presidential
administration loath to have human rights lawyers interfering with large-scale
operations on Guantinamo and the Caribbean Sea-and a federal appellate court
zealously supportive of the administration's position. 25 Although the district court
issued a preliminary injunction halting the interview process and granting the
plaintiffs' lawyers access to Guantinamo, the Eleventh Circuit quickly vacated the.
injunction and, remarkably, remanded the action to the district court with instructions
to dismiss it. 26 On February 24, 1992, just three months after the litigation began,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari, putting an end to the Baker case. 27
But almost immediately, students at Yale Law School-a few of whom had done
research for Kurzban in the Baker case-began talking about filing a second suit.
After intense discussion and a frantic effort to draft a complaint and a temporary
restraining order (TRO) application, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on March 17,
1992.28 The gravamen of the complaint was that the plaintiffs had a right to counsel
and that the lawyers had a First Amendment right to communicate with their
clients-a claim not precluded by Baker because Koh and the other McNary attorneys
were not part of that earlier case. 29 Several dozen students and a number of
experienced litigators were involved in McNary, perhaps most notably Michael
21. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
22. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1992); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
23. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
24. Id. at 5-6.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1992); see GOLDSTEIN, CITRON
& LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
27. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
28. 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 6. The case was later
recaptioned Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Sale after Gene McNary stepped down as commissioner of the
INS on January 20, 1993, and Chris Sale assumed the position of acting commissioner.
29. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541; GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 18-24.
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Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights, who at the time was running the
Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic with Koh at Yale.
Little more than a week after the case was filed, Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. issued a
TRO halting the interview process, barring any further repatriations, and granting the
plaintiffs' attorneys access to Guantinamo.30 It was a stunning development, and days
later, to the extreme displeasure of the administration, several plaintiffs' lawyers and law
students were flown by government transport plane to Guantinamo to meet with their
clients and gather facts about the interview process." On April 6, after another hearing,
Judge Johnson issued a preliminary injunction that kept in place the prohibition against
interviews and repatriations.3 2 But the breakneck pace of the litigation continued, and
after the Second Circuit refused to stay the injunction, the Justice Department raced
to the Supreme Court, which issued a stay order on April 22.
Following the stay, the INS hurriedly implemented a new plan at Guantdnamo.
Up to this point, all "screened-in" Haitians-those who had established a credible
fear of persecution-had been flown to the United States to seek asylum with the
assistance of counsel.3 4 But several hundred such screened-in individuals had recently
tested positive for HIV-in an era of widespread panic, even hysteria, about AIDS-
and the Bush administration opted to keep this group on Guantinamo.15 Not only
did the administration believe it would be politically unpopular to allow them into
the United States, but a controversial federal regulation in place at the time barred
HIV-positive aliens from entering the country.36 Accordingly, the INS began holding
formal asylum hearings at Guantinamo for these HIV-positive, screened-in
Haitians-but without the statutorily mandated access to counsel." All those who
30. McNary, 789 F. Supp. at 545, 548; GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 6.
31. See GOLDSTEIN, CITRON &LAND, supra note 1, at 6.
32. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 969 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1992), vacatedas mootsub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 6.
33. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 503 U.S. 1000, 1000-01 (1992); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND,
supra note 1, at 6.
34. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 6-7.
35. Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 56-57. Many of the parents or guardians of children tested positive for
HIV but the children did not. These families were separated from the rest of the refugees. Furthermore,
the HIV testing was not always accurate. Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantdnamo HIV Camp:
The Intersection ofPolitics and Litigation, 11 HARV. Hum. RTs. J. 187, 195 & n.38 (1998). Children were
not separately screened unless they were unaccompanied by a parent or guardian. Clawson, Detweiler &
Ho, supra note 6, at 2341 n.19.
36. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(4) (1992). At the time, the attorney general had the power to "parole" into the
United States HIV-positive aliens for "emergent reasons," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994), and to waive
the HIV exclusion on an individual basis for "humanitarian purposes." Id. § 1157(c)(3). The Justice
Department refused to use either of these options to bring the HIV-positive Haitian refugees into the
United States. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 333 n.120.
37. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 6.
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either failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or refused to submit to
the hearing were then sent back to Haiti."
During this process, the case took a dramatic new turn, with the White House
taking a much harder line against the ongoing exodus of Haitians from their homeland.
On May 24, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued an executive order authorizing
the Coast Guard to return all fleeing Haitians directly to Haiti without first conducting
screening interviews." On its face, the order seemed to violate the plain language of
both the Refugee Act of 198040 and Article 33 of the U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, which prohibit the "return" of individuals to a place where they fear
persecution. 41 Days later, the plaintiffs' lawyers sought a TRO from Judge Johnson that
would halt the administration's new direct return policy.42
On May 29, Judge Johnson heard arguments by Harold Koh and Solicitor General
Kenneth Starr, who made the rare move of appearing in a U.S. district court to convey
the White House's concern. On June 6, Judge Johnson ruled for the government, 43 but
the Second Circuit reversed his decision on July 29 and enjoined the Bush
administration from returning Haitians without conducting screening interviews.4
Just three days later, however, the Supreme Court issued a stay of the Second Circuit's
order, and the direct return policy immediately went back into effect.4 5
By mid-July, the only Haitians left at GuantAnamo were HIV-positive individuals
who had either: (1) proved a well-founded fear of persecution in an asylum hearing or
(2) not yet undergone an asylum hearing for various reasons.46 Unable to send this
group of people back to Haiti and unwilling to bring them to the United States, the
38. Id. at 7.
39. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992).
40. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994) ("The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U. ST. 6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968) ("No Contracting State shall
expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.").
42. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 7.
43. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June
5), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'dsub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155
(1993). Judge Johnson's opinion indicated that he felt compelled by Second Circuit precedent to rule in
the government's favor, but he was clearly troubled by the Bush administration's policy. He called it
"unconscionable" and wrote that he was "astonished that the United States would return [the] refugees
to the jaws of political persecution, terror, death and uncertainty." Id. at *5.
44. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1992), revg 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8452, at *1; GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 7.
45. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 505 U.S. 1234, 1234 (1992); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND,
supra note 1, at 7.
46. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 7.
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government relocated them to a remote spot on Guantinamo known as Camp
Bulkeley,47 surrounded it with razor wire, erected guard towers, and evidently
planned to hold the detainees there indefinitely.48
Soon after, in the fall of 1992, electoral politics assumed a central role in the
litigation. On the campaign trail, Bill Clinton, the Democratic presidential nominee,
had repeatedly criticized the Bush administration's direct return policy and stated his
intention to reverse that policy if elected. 49 There were also indications that Clinton
intended to lift the ban on HIV-positive aliens once he became president, which led
many to expect that he would release the Haitians on Guantinamo. There was
widespread, though not unanimous, belief among the plaintiffs' team that the
litigation would soon be over.
But after Clinton was elected president, he jettisoned his campaign positions on
the Haitians. On January 14, 1993, six days before his inauguration, he adopted the
Bush administration's direct return policy, and not long afterward, he also declined
to remove the HIV ban.so Congress later voted to make the ban-at the time only a
federal regulation-federal law.5 ' As a consequence, the Haitians detained on
Guantinamo could only enter the United States if the attorney general provided
individual waivers for all of them, and the Clinton administration made clear to the
plaintiffs' lawyers that it would not do so. 52 Astonishingly, at a meeting in Washington
at the time, a Justice Department official told Harold Koh, Michael Ratner, and Yale
student Mike Wishnie that "[iun the view of those close to the president, he can
weather dead HIV-positive Haitians on Guantinamo better than the political fallout
of letting them into the U.S."s3
The litigation came to a head that spring. The original suit filed a year earlier,
which focused on the rights of lawyers and clients to communicate with one another,
had now evolved into two distinct cases, both of them far more ambitious than the
initial action: (1) a suit to obtain the release of the HIV-positive Haitians detained on
Guantinamo,' 4 and (2) a suit to put an end to the Bush administration's "direct return"
47. Id. Notably, this would later be part of the area used to hold terrorist suspects after the George W. Bush
administration chose to use Guantinamo as a detention facility in early 2002. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 309.
48. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5, 7-8.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 7, 9.
51. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, § 2007, 107 Stat. 122,
210, amended by Tom Lantos & Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 305, 122 Stat. 2918,
2963; GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 9.
52. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 163.
53. Id. at 214.
54. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (ordering the release of HIV-
positive Haitian nationals); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 817 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(issuing an interim order requiring the government to provide the Haitians detained on Guantinamo
18
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policy of forcibly repatriating Haitians to their homeland without screening
interviews." Harold Koh argued the direct return case before the Supreme Court on
March 2, and just a week later, the trial for the release of the Guantinamo Haitians
began in Brooklyn before Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.5 6 The most damning revelation
of the trial was the admission in open court by a government attorney that the
Haitians who had developed full-blown AIDS were not receiving adequate medical
treatment but would nevertheless remain on Guantinamo.5 The trial concluded on
March 25, and a day later, Judge Johnson issued an interim order requiring the
government to either release all the Haitians who were not receiving adequate medical
care or provide them adequate care while still in confinement."
The government chose to free them, and the first members of this group arrived
in the United States on April 5, 1993.59 Judge Johnson issued his final decision on
June 8, 1993, holding that constitutional due process barred the U.S. government
from detaining the Haitians indefinitely on Guantinamo without charge. 60 In his
opinion, the judge wrote:
Although the defendants euphemistically refer to [the] Guantanamo
operation as a "humanitarian camp," the facts disclose that it is nothing more
than an HIV prison camp presenting potential public health risks to the
Haitians held there....
... [Their] plight is a tragedy of immense proportion and their continued
detainment is totally unacceptable to this Court.6 '
The last Haitians on Guantinamo were released into the United States on June 21,
1993, for medical treatment and resettlement. 62
with adequate medical care or to evacuate them to someplace other than Haiti where they could obtain
proper medical care).
55. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6), aff'din
part, vacatedin part, 969 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1992), vacatedas mootsub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
56. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 9. Lead counsel for the plaintiffs at trial was Joseph
Tringali, a partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett who had been part of the plaintiffs' team since the
filing of the initial TRO application a year earlier. Tringali attended the symposium. See Storming the
Court Speakers, supra note 5.
57. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 266-67. This admission was made by Robert Begleiter of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. Begleiter spoke at the symposium about his
experiences working on the case. Robert Begleiter, Partner, Constantine Cannon LLP, Remarks at the
New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Storming the Court: 25 Years After H.C.C. v. Sale
(Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.youtu.be/OqP3hiXkzNs?t=6m45s.
58. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 337; GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 9.
59. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 9.
60. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1045 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
61. Id. at 1038-39, 1045.
62. GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 9; Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United
States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2397 (1994). In early August 1993, the government
19
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In a case of remarkable timing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the
direct return case on June 21 as well, but it ruled in favor of the government and held
that the direct return policy violated neither federal nor international law.63 As
Harold Koh has argued, it may have been an 8-1 decision, but the opinion, authored
by Justice John Paul Stevens, is utterly unpersuasive. 64 It ignores the plain language
of both the Refugee Act of 1980 and Article 33-refusing to give effect to the clear
command not to "return" refugees-and expressly admits to disregarding the purpose
of both laws. 65 As Justice Stevens wrote:
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol-like the
drafters of § 243(h)-may not have contemplated that any nation would
gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had
desperately sought to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of
Article 33 ....
"Although the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be
found in a judicial remedy. "66
II. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF SALE
The preceding summary of HCC v. Sale should provide useful background for
readers as they consider this symposium issue, but it does not remotely capture the
great human drama of the case. The story of the Haiti case presents life-and-death
stakes, all the plot twists and turns of a legal thriller, and a cast of remarkable real-
life characters. It is no surprise that it might one day become a Hollywood movie."
First, the litigation was driven in significant part by the participation of dozens of
appealed Judge Johnson's decision. It had no effect on the refugees, who were now in the United States,
but the Clinton Justice Department did not want to let stand a ruling that the due process clause applied
to Guantinamo. In October, the plaintiffs' attorneys and the Justice Department reached a final
settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the government would drop its appeal and reimburse
plaintiffs' counsel over $634,000 for litigation costs and attorneys' fees. In exchange, plaintiffs' counsel
would join a motion by the Justice Department to vacate Judge Johnson's final order. On February 22,
1994, Judge Johnson approved the settlement and vacated the order. See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at
298-301. Accordingly, there was no precedent regarding the application of the due process clause to
Guantinamo when the George W. Bush administration reopened it as a detention facility for suspected
terrorists in early 2002. Id. at 309-10.
63. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993); GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra
note 1, at 9.
64. Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
1-2, 15-17 (1994).
65. Sale, 509 U.S. at 171-88.
66. Id. at 183, 188 (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
67. The film rights to the story were originally purchased by Warner Bros. and a screenplay has been
written by Michael Seitzman, but there are currently no production plans. Michael Fleming, Warners
Storms 'Court,' VARIETY (Mar. 17, 2005, 9:00 PM), http://variety.com/2005/film/markets-festivals/
warners-storms-court-1117919741/.
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law students, who overcame inexperience with energy and hard work, handling
everything from client interviews on Guantinamo to direct examinations at trial to
negotiations with government lawyers to the resettlement of the Haitians in New
York City and elsewhere after their release. The students were not just passionate and
committed, but exceedingly strong-willed, and it is fair to say that Sale never would
have been filed had they not forced the issue with Harold Koh and his colleagues.
Second, the case had an extraordinarily high profile among politicians, policymakers,
and the media-hardly surprising, given that the plaintiffs' team was seen by two
presidential administrations to be interfering in a major foreign policy crisis with
highly charged political implications. Indeed, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton were both actively concerned about the litigation and its possible effects on
their efforts to manage the situation both in Haiti and on Guantinamo. Third, Sale
rocketed through the courts with almost unprecedented velocity-by Koh's count, it
reached the Supreme Court for one reason or another no less than eight times-
followed by a district court trial and a Supreme Court merits argument that both
took place less than one year after the original complaint was filed. Fourth, the clients
on Guantinamo were not passive observers, but active-even disruptive-agents for
their cause. They held protests and marches, openly challenged the motives and
efficacy of their attorneys, staged a hunger strike, and late in the case even broke out
of their detention camp, leading to brutally repressive measures by the military
officials charged with guarding them (including, among other things, solitary
confinement for some of the detainees).6 1
The story of the case is so dramatic, in fact, that I was compelled to research and
write a narrative account of it with the collaboration of many of the litigation's
principal figures. The resulting book, Storming the Court, tells the story of Sale from
the perspectives of Koh, several of the students, two of the government lawyers, and
a Haitian refugee with the pseudonym Yvonne Pascal.69 In addition to serving as an
extensively-documented record of the litigation, the book is a David-and-Goliath
tale, pitting a team of human rights lawyers and law students against the most
powerful litigation force in the world: the U.S. government. It is also a testament to
the courage and perseverance of a group of Haitian detainees who were held on
Guantinamo very much like prisoners of war, despite having committed no crime.
68. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 201-02, 257-58, 310 (recounting the Haitian refugees' experiences
while held at Guantinamo).
69. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1. Storming the Court primarily focuses on Yale Law School students
Lisa Daugaard, Michael Wishnie, and Tory Clawson, all of whom attended the New York Law School
symposium, but I also wrote about the experiences of around twenty other students. The government
lawyers I focused on were Paul Cappuccio, Deputy Associate Attorney General at the Justice
Department during the George H.W. Bush administration, and Robert Begleiter, who was then chief of
the Civil Division at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York (though I also
wrote about Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Dunn and several others). Yvonne Pascal was not at the
symposium, but her older son did attend. It bears noting that the book was only possible because of the
extraordinary generosity and patience of the aforementioned individuals and many others, who
collectively endured hundreds of hours of interviews with the author.
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Equally important, the story of the case remains a cautionary tale about both our
government's conduct in the face of a refugee crisis and the dangers of using
Guantinamo as an extralegal detention facility beyond the reach of American
(indeed, any) law. Taking the issue of refugee crises first: We live in a period that
might be deemed the Age of the Refugee. As of the writing of this piece, there are
almost 65 million displaced persons in the world-more than the population of
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand combined-and the ongoing war in Syria
alone has produced some 4.9 million refugees. 0 Turkey currently hosts roughly 2.5
million of those Syrian refugees and Lebanon another one million, the latter despite
having a population of about 4.5 million people." These overwhelming numbers
provide an extraordinary contrast to the Haitian crisis of the early 1990s, which
involved a mere 35,000 refugees.7 2 Yet the government of the United States, by far
the wealthiest nation in the world, reacted then as if the fleeing Haitians presented a
grave threat to national security-and took a series of measures, from indefinite
detention on Guantinamo to the morally untenable direct return policy, that in
retrospect seem even more cold-hearted and senseless than they did at the time.
After adopting the direct return policy, President George H.W. Bush assured the
media that "the Statue of Liberty still stands,"" but if the men, women, and children
fleeing Haiti in 1991 and 1992-many of them democracy activists-were not the
huddled masses yearning to breathe free, then who would be? To be sure, the Bush
administration did allow a number of Haitians to enter the country before adopting
the direct return policy in May 1992, and the United States continues today to offer
safe haven to a limited number of refugees from around the world. But it is difficult
to believe that we are shouldering our fair share of the refugee burden, not only in
light of the extreme burdens faced by countries such as Turkey and Lebanon, but also
by Western European nations such as Germany, which currently has about 300,000
Syrian refugees.74 By contrast, as of August 2016, the United States has accepted a
total of only 12,000 Syrian refugees since civil war began five years ago." Instead, as
Harold Koh points out in his piece for this issue, we generally fail to deal adequately
with the root cause of the problem-in this case, the war in Syria-and rather treat
70. Adrian Edwards, Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High, UNHCR (June 20, 2016), http://www.
unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html.
71. See Syria's Refugee Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT'L (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/
72. See GOLDSTEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 1, at 5.
73. James Gerstenzang, President Angrily Defends Haiti Repatriation Order, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-28/news/mn-439-1_president-angrily.
74. Europe Migrant Crisis: Germany Expects 'up to 300,000' This Year, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-3720 7
8 0 0 ; cf Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven
Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131 9 11 (stating that the
vast majority of migrants are from Syria).
75. Haeyoun Park & Rudy Omri, U S. Reaches Goal ofAdmitting 10,000 Syrian Refugees. Here's Where They
Went., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/30/us/syrian-refugees-
in-the-united-states.html.
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those who flee as the problem instead of a symptom.16 This is not to say that we
should ignore legitimate security issues raised by our immigration and refugee
policies, but surely there is a balance to be struck between security and humanitarian
concerns, particularly in light of the vast advantage in resources that the United
States enjoys in comparison to, say, Lebanon.
The reference above to the Statue of Liberty brings me back to Guantinamo, for
as I argued during the symposium, if the former is an expression of what is best in
America, Guantinamo may well have come to represent the worst-the dark shadow
of American fear, anger, and lawlessness. The Bush administration chose to hold the
Haitian refugees on Guantinamo in part because it contended that U.S. law did not
apply there, supposedly enabling the administration to treat the refugees however it
saw fit. The impetus may have been convenience and flexibility, but this position is
fatally flawed. Not only did it prove to be mistaken as a matter of law-rejected first
by Judge Johnson in his final order in 1993 that due process applies on Guantinamon
and then over a decade later by a series of Supreme Court decisions relating to the
terrorist suspects"-but it resulted in unconscionable policy choices by the U.S.
government, none more appalling than the refusal to provide the detained Haitians
with proper medical care. 9
In George Santayana's oft-repeated phrase, "[t]hose who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it."" And condemned we have been after the George
W. Bush administration repeated the errors of the two previous administrations,
reopening Guantinamo as a detention facility during the War on Terror. The results
were predictably catastrophic: the long-term incarceration of innocent people,
inhumane treatment and even torture, and the unwitting creation of a recruiting tool
for Islamic terrorists. The warning signs were there during the earlier detainment of
the Haitians, but the Bush administration ignored the lessons of the- Sale case.
Indeed, Justice Department lawyers went out of their way in a December 2001 legal
memo to advise the administration that Judge Johnson's decision imposing due
process constraints on Guantinamo had been vacated, leaving no precedent that
might constrain federal officials in their treatment of the terrorist suspect detainees."
Fifteen years later, here we are: The very word "Guantinamo" is shorthand for
cruelty, hypocrisy, and lawlessness.
76. Harold Hongju Koh, The Enduring Legacies ofthe Haitian Refugee Litigation, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31,
65 n.229 (2016).
77. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
78. These three Supreme Court cases ruled in favor of Guantinamo detainees, holding that U.S. law applies
there. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
79. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 244, 266, 276.
80. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1905-06).
81. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin &John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attys Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba 6-7 (Dec. 28,2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20011228.pdf.
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III. THE CONTRIBUTORS: FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON SALE
The four pieces that follow, all from symposium participants, offer rich and
contrasting perspectives of the Sale litigation. While they all consider the broader
legacy of the case, there is a distinctly personal element to them as well. This is not
by coincidence. A common theme of those who spoke at the symposium was the
lasting impact the litigation had on them individually. As should be clear by now, it
was an unusually intense and demanding case that taxed the intellectual, emotional,
and even physical reserves of the participants, and few of them emerged unchanged.82
Any number of more traditional analyses of the litigation are available in prior
articles;" what the contributions in this issue offer is more personal, even intimate,
starting with the interview of Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.84
A. A Reflection on HCC v. Sale: A Conversation with Judge SterlingJohnson, Jr.
Judge Johnson, a lifelong New Yorker and former narcotics prosecutor for the
City of New York, had only been on the bench about six months when he was
assigned the Sale case. 5 Despite pressure from the administration to give the case the
back of his hand, Judge Johnson granted the plaintiffs' initial TRO application and
ultimately issued the final judgment and order, some fifteen months later, that
released the Haitians from detention on Guantinamo.86 In the interview, he sheds
light on how his background has influenced his judicial decisionmaking and, in
addition to several memorable anecdotes from the case, he offers a frank, even blunt,
assessment of the ways he believes that race influenced the government's treatment
of the Haitians." Judge Johnson used appropriately harsh language in his decision
releasing the detainees on Guantinamo; he is even tougher in this interview. For
readers accustomed to (and perhaps weary of) judges speaking with bland
circumspection in public forums, his words will serve as a bracing corrective.
B. HCC's Lasting Impact; Remarks from Senator Chris Coons
Two more pieces offer perspectives from a pair of former law students who
worked on the litigation (and remain good friends to this day): U.S. Senator
Christopher Coons and Albany law professor Ray Brescia. Senator Coons, a third-
year student at the time the case was filed, was struggling to finish a long-overdue
paper just a few months before graduation when Brescia and other students corralled
82. It would be difficult to overstate how hard some of the lawyers and students worked. Student Lisa
Daugaard, whom I interviewed dozens of times while researching the story, got so little sleep that at one
point, her hair began to fall out and her gums began to bleed.
83. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 64; Koh, supra note 62; Ratner, supra note 35.
84. Sterling Johnson, Jr., A Reflection on HCC v. Sale: A Conversation Between the Honorable SterlingJohnson,
Jr. and Professor Brandt Goldstein, 61 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 69 (2016).
85. Id. at 70-72.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 70-72, 75-78.
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him in early March 1992, seeking his assistance on bluebooking a brief that would
accompany the plaintiffs' application for a TRO. Coons agreed to provide a few
hours of help, but, like a number of his classmates, ended up working on the case
essentially full-time until graduation day. In his remarks, the senator offers insight
into the way the case has affected his work on Capitol Hill and in particular the
importance he places on giving a voice to the voiceless." In addition, in an especially
resonant passage, Senator Coons discusses his tour of Guantinamo in its current
form as a detention facility for terrorist suspects."
C. Professor Raymond H. Brescia-Through a Glass, Clearly; Reflections on Team
Lawyering, Clinically Taught
For his part, Professor Brescia offers a thoughtful, persuasive account of how and
why the law students worked so effectively as a team in Sale.90 Brescia writes not only
as a former student involved in the case, but now as a professor himself at Albany
Law School, working with students on projects in much the way he once did with
Harold Koh, Michael Ratner, and other practitioners. Drawing on the literature of>
team-building as well as his personal experience in the case, Brescia identifies some
of the key components that contribute to successful student teams, including the
opportunity for them to develop mastery over a subject and to operate with a
considerable degree of autonomy, as well as the importance of working with a strong
sense of collective purpose." Moreover, Brescia is adamant that the student
experience in the Haiti case, though extraordinary, was not unique. His message in
this regard is important enough to preview it here:
Although some might say this [experience] was only possible at a law school like
Yale, I disagree. I have seen law students and undergraduates from all types of
institutions, including where I teach now, rise to the occasion to take on difficult
projects, stick with them, produce innovative work, learn and grow from the
experience, and change the world, even if just a little bit. There is something
about that trust and confidence that both spurs the granting of autonomy, and
can bring out the best in people. . . . Teams should not go into a setting
unprepared or untrained, but once ready and trained, they should be given
leeway to execute projects large and small in order to bring out their best.92
88. Chris Coons, HCC's Lasting Impact; Remarks from Senator Chris Coons, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81
(2016).
89. Id. at 85.
90. It is no accident that the group referred to itself as "Team Haiti."
91. Raymond H. Brescia, Through a Glass, Clearly; Reflections on Team Lawyering, Clinically Taught, 61
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 87, 94-111 (2016).
92. Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
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D. Professor Harold Koh-The Enduring Legacies of the Haitian Refugee Litigation
Finally, we present the symposium keynote address by Harold Koh, who, since
litigating Sale, has served as Yale Law School's dean and, at the State Department, as
both Legal Adviser under President Barack Obama and Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor under President Bill Clinton. I am,
however, quite confident that if Koh were asked to identify the most significant
accomplishments of his legal career, he would put the Haiti case at or near the top of
the list-not only for the impact it had on those released from Guantinamo, but for
the lifelong friendships and personal transformation that resulted from his work on
the case. His address, which reflects an abiding commitment to the issues raised in
Sale as well as the continuing camaraderie of Team Haiti, puts the case in a broader
historical, legal, and strategic context.
Koh makes three important points. First, he explains that Sale is only one
instance of efforts by both the United States and other governments to establish
"legal back holes" in the name of national security." By this, Koh means the creation
of zones beyond the reach of human rights law, both through the implementation of
physical operations-such as offshore detention camps and interdiction operations
on the high seas-and the deployment of specious legal arguments in their defense.94
Guantanamo and the Haitian interdiction program are of course paradigmatic
examples of the former, and the Supreme Court's Sale decision is a prime example of
the latter. Unfortunately, as Koh explains, certain other countries have followed
America's lead in the creation of legal black holes, using high seas interdiction,
establishing offshore detention facilities, and persuading courts to limit the
geographic reach of human rights treaties.9"
But as Koh argues, this bleaker legacy has been countered by two other
developments that also trace back in part to Sale.96 The first development is the rise
of transnational public law litigation." This model replaces the traditional view of
litigation-a private claim for damages, a retrospective orientation-with a more
expansive approach: a complex public law claim to address a systemic problem, a
prospective orientation with a focus on injunctive relief, and, importantly, the use of
the lawsuit as a bargaining chip in political negotiations." Koh considers a number
of recent decisions in tribunals beyond the United States that reflect this new
approach-decisions that have largely rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sale
and affirmed the application of human rights norms to, for instance, interdiction on
93. Koh, supra note 76, at 35.
94. Id. For example, an overbroad presumption against extraterritorial application of human rights norms
and the argument that such norms are displaced by the law of armed conflict.
95. Id. at 44 n.68 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 35-36, 55.
97. Id. at 54-58.
98. Id. at 58-59.
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the high seas." Moreover, as Koh notes, the Supreme Court itself has largely come
around to Judge Johnson's position that Guantinamo is not a legal black hole.'00
The second positive legacy of Sale that Koh identifies is the rise of a more robust
and widespread form of human rights advocacy, fueled by both the active engagement
of legal scholars and, crucially, human rights clinics based at law schools and staffed
by motivated, idealistic law students.'0 ' Koh has in mind the sort of work being done
by, among many others, his former students and Team Haiti alumni Sarah Cleveland
at Columbia Law School and Mike Wishnie at Yale Law School (the latter of whom
was an instrumental participant in the symposium). School-based human rights
clinics are, of course, a subset of the broader clinical practice and experiential learning
movement that has had a revolutionary impact in American legal education, including
here at New York Law School. 02
IV. IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL RATNER
Finally, no discussion of Sale would be remotely complete without acknowledging
the central role played in the litigation by Michael Ratner, a leader of the plaintiffs'
team and the former president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, who died on
May 11, 2016, at the age of seventy-two. Ratner had more experience in human
rights litigation than anyone else involved in the case and understood all too well
what the plaintiffs were up against. Years before Sale, he had repeatedly sued the
U.S. government-and repeatedly lost.'o3 Indeed, after Judge Johnson issued his
initial TRO in favor of the plaintiffs, Koh had asked Ratner what they were supposed
to do next and Ratner replied, "I don't know. I've never won one of these before." 04
Not that losing ever deterred the man. Even if a case had no chance in court, he
firmly believed in filing it for other reasons: to throw a spotlight on the wrongdoing
of the defendants, draw the attention of the media and the public, generate political
pressure, and create negotiating leverage-an early form of the transnational model
of litigation that Koh discusses in his piece. But beyond any strategic considerations,
Ratner was always guided by an unwavering and unapologetic commitment to
99. Id. at 44.
100. See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004).
101. Koh, supra note 76, at 62.
102. New York Law School has twenty-six student-staffed clinics ranging from civil rights to criminal
defense to immigration. Through the New York Law School Impact Center for Public Interest Law,
students can also participate in the Safe Passage Project (which provides representation of unaccompanied
minors in the immigration process), the Racial Justice Project, and other efforts. For more information,
see Academics: Office of Clinical and Experiential Learning, N.Y.L. ScH., http://www.nyls.edu/academics/
office of clinicaland-experiential_1earning/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). For an analysis of the impact
clinical legal education has on developing students' lawyering skills, see Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey
Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cit. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp.
893 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cit. 1983).
104. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 88-89.
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principle. Not long after Guantinamo was reopened as a detention camp as part of
the War on Terror, Ratner sued the U.S. government on behalf of the new
detainees.'os The case was so controversial at the time that even some of Ratner's
traditional allies did not want to be involved. Americans were still in shock over
9/11, the nation was at war in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq was not long off.
Ratner was the target of ugly criticism and even death threats.
Yet he pressed on, and years later-after many dozens of lawyers had joined him
in the fight-he was vindicated in a triumvirate of decisions by the Supreme Court.0 '
In one of those cases, Rasul v. Bush, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority, said that if a detainee was not involved in terrorism, holding him for years
at Guantdnamo without access to a lawyer "unquestionably" violated the "Constitution
or laws or. treaties of the United States."o' The Rasul ruling was, perhaps, the
definitive legal expression of the intuitive sense of injustice that had driven Lisa
Daugaard and Michael Barr to knock on Harold Koh's door a dozen years earlier.
Ratner's former colleague, Georgetown law professor David Cole, later asked
him what chance he thought he had of winning when he first brought the case in
2002. "None whatsoever," Ratner said.' "We filed 100 percent on principle."'o
"That," said Cole in an interview soon after Ratner's death, "could be his epitaph.""10
Michael Ratner was too ill to join us at the symposium last fall, and though he was
dearly missed, he was mentioned often and warmly during the event. His passing is
an incalculable loss not just for the human rights community-in the narrow sense of
the lawyers and activists and clients alongside whom he fought-but for the human
community as a whole. Few people have worked so long and so hard for such
important causes, and with the publication of this issue, the symposium participants
and Team Haiti recognize Michael for all he has done for the cause of human rights
in the United States and throughout the world.
105. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Michael Ratner was part of the legal team on Rasul. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 309; David Cole, MichaelRatner's Army, N.Y. REV. BOOKs (May 15, 2016), http://www.
nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/15/michael-ratner-army-fight-against-guantanamo/.
106. See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause has full effect
at Guantinamo and that detainees are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (holding that the executive must comply with the prevailing rule of law when
trying and punishing detainees held at Guantinamo for crimes unrelated to terrorism); Rasul, 542 U.S.
at 485 (holding that the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of indefinite detention).
107. 542 U.S. at 483 n.15.
108. Sam Roberts, Michael Ratner, Lawyer Who Won Rights for Guantanamo Prisoners, Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/us/michael-ratner-lawyer-who-won-rights-for-
guantanamo-prisoners-dies-at-72.html.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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ADDENDUM-NOVEMBER 14, 2016
Days before this issue was scheduled to go to publication, Donald J. Trump was
elected as the forty-fifth president of the United States. On the campaign trail, he
declared his intention to keep the U.S. detention facility at Guantinamo open and
"load it up with some bad dudes,""' whatever that might mean. He also pledged to
bring back waterboarding and "a hell of a lot worse ,"2 and even proposed trying
American terrorist suspects before military commissions on Guantanamo, though he
offered no legal basis for this last notion."'
As of mid-November 2016, Guantinamo only holds about sixty detainees, a
third of whom have been cleared for release," 4 but it now seems almost certain that
President Obama will not manage to close the detention facility before leaving the
White House. We cannot know for sure what President Trump, as opposed to
candidate Trump, will do when he takes office-in the early days after the election,
he backed away from a number of campaign promises-but there is little reason to
believe he will change his position on Guantinamo, particularly given the widespread
Republican opposition to closing it. And so, it seems, the story of our ill-fated
detention policy there will drag on through yet another administration.
111. David Welna, Trump Has Vowed to Fill Guantanamo with 'Some Bad Dudes' -But Who?, NPR (Nov. 14,
2016, 2:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/11/14/502007304/trump-has-vowed-to-
fill-guantanamo-with-some-bad-dudes-but-who.
112. Kristina Wong & Rebecca Kheel, Five Things to Watch for with Trump's Pentagon, HILL (Nov. 12, 2016,
4:31 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/305583-five-things-to-watch-for-with-donald-trumps-
pentagon.
113. See Welna, supra note 111.
114. Id.
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